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TITLE: Paranoia: a social account 
 
Abstract: 
 
Both psychology and psychiatry are dominated by individualistic accounts of paranoia 
(and indeed, other forms of distress). As a corrective to these, this paper provides a social 
account of paranoia grounded in a minimal notion of embodied subjectivity constituted 
from the interpenetration of feelings, perception and discourse. Paranoia is 
conceptualised as a mode or tendency within embodied subjectivity, co-constituted in the 
dialectical associations between subjectivity and relational, social and material 
influences. Relevant psychiatric and psychological literature is briefly reviewed; 
relational, social structural and material influences upon paranoia are described; and 
some implications of this account for research and intervention are highlighted. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Paranoia: a social account 
Introduction 
 
Paranoia can be defined as a way of perceiving and relating to other people and to the 
world that is characterized by some degree of suspicion, mistrust, or hostility. It is usually 
understood to exist on a continuum, so that degrees of paranoia inhabit many everyday 
social relations. When it reaches clinical levels, paranoia is frequently characterized by 
complex, self-insulating conspiratorial belief systems, distorted perceptions, and high 
levels of distress. In this paper we treat paranoia as a socially and materially co-
constituted mode of, or tendency within, embodied subjectivity. We understand it as a 
way of being in the world, manifested differentially according to changing social, cultural 
and material circumstances and the specifics of life trajectories. Relational influences, 
social structures and material environments therefore play a constitutive role in our 
account, rather than being merely supplementary or contextual. We not only recognise 
that paranoia is socially constructed (Heise, 1988), we also recognise that it is 
relationally, societally and materially co-constituted: in this way we avoid the extreme 
relativism of some constructionist accounts, and are able to address paranoia not only as a 
discursive form or rhetorical resource but as a complex lived experience constituted from 
multiple lines of influence.   
 
In order to offer an appropriately social account of paranoia we locate it’s origins and 
maintenance in the dialectical interpenetration of subjectivity and world, rather than 
within the faulty cognitions or pathological brains of individuals. This allows us to 
acknowledge that paranoia can be both dysfunctional and distressing, whilst not reifying 
it as an organic pathology. Although we recognise that brain features (neurotransmitter 
excesses, hormonal imbalances, increased density of dopamine receptors, etc.) may be 
correlated with distress, we reject the reductionist view that these are simply causal of 
paranoia. Instead, our account locates such features within the homeodynamic flux of 
material forces and social relations that not only co-constitutes subjectivity but also, 
simultaneously and relatedly, has an ongoing influence on the character of the body-brain 
system. The structure and chemistry of the brain are somewhat plastic, capable of being 
influenced by experience, habit, and repetition. Unremarkable activities such as taxi 
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driving (Maguire et al., 2000) and piano playing (Bangert & Altenmueller, 2003) cause 
measurable change in brain structures, whilst clinical research has shown that decreased 
hippocampal volume may be associated with combat-related post-traumatic stress 
(Bremner et al., 1995), and that just 12 weeks of cognitive therapy causes significant 
changes to patterns of brain activation (Wykes & Brammer, 2002). Similarly, work with 
animals has shown that changes in social status impact causally on levels of the 
neurotransmitter serotonin (Raleigh, McGuire, Brammer, & Yuwiler, 1984), and that 
stressful situations increase levels of dopamine (Weiss, Glazer, & Pohoresky, 1976). 
Such evidence challenges the notion that biology is simply foundational and 
demonstrates the poverty of dualist, reductionist explanations. It implies that we should 
adopt a position similar to that held by Rose when he says: “Organisms – any organism, 
even the seemingly simplest – and the environment – all relevant aspects of it – 
interpenetrate. Abstracting an organism from its environment, ignoring this dialectic of 
interpenetration, is a reductionist step which methodology may demand but which will 
always mislead” (Rose, 1997 p.140). In an academic and cultural context where dualism 
and reductionism are frequently presupposed, it can be difficult to convey this more 
dynamic and interactional view of the relationship between social and neural realms. In 
this paper, we attempt to do so in part by interweaving discussion of neural systems with 
discussion of social factors, since the more usual practice of describing these separately is 
too easily misinterpreted as a move towards foundationalism, and too frequently misread 
as endorsing the claim that neural systems are simply causal of experience. 
 
Our inclusion of relational, societal and material influences allows us to acknowledge 
that the extremes of paranoia can be both distressing and unusual, without necessarily 
casting them as inexplicable. We propose that even these extremes become potentially 
sensible within the complex, synergistic interactions of relational, social and material 
influences, and that the social, psychological and neural processes that generate them are 
for the most part those that are productive of paranoia across the continuum. This is not 
to say that states of extreme paranoia are not striking and remarkable: our aim is not to 
normalise such experiences as merely commonsensical; rather, to challenge the notion 
that people experiencing these extremes are somehow intrinsically different to others. 
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In what follows, we first review some relevant psychiatric and clinical psychological 
literature. We then offer an account of paranoia grounded in a minimal notion of 
embodied subjectivity constituted jointly from discourse, perception and feelings. We 
show how this grounding enables meaningful associations to be drawn between social 
structures and relations, material conditions and paranoia, and briefly discuss some of the 
implications of this for research and intervention. 
 
Paranoia, psychiatry and clinical psychology 
 
In psychiatry, paranoia is typically understood as a symptom rather than an experience to 
be considered on its own terms. It is frequently associated with schizophrenia, delusional 
disorder and paranoid personality disorder, but may also be related to diagnoses such as 
depression and anxiety (American Psychiatric Association, 1994). It is assumed in 
psychiatry that experiences of paranoia are clearly distinguishable and separate from 
everyday states of being, and that they are false or irrational, the effects of some 
underlying pathology: accordingly, their context is regarded as relatively irrelevant and 
their content as largely meaningless (Harper, 1996, 2004). In accord with these 
assumptions psychiatry frequently searches for the causes of paranoia within the brain-
body systems of individuals, an orientation simultaneously reflecting its medical basis, its 
longstanding preference for biological explanations (Moncrieff & Crawford, 2001) and 
its interdependent relationship with the pharmaceutical industry (Healy, 1997). 
Psychiatric research has uncovered some suggestive associations, for example between 
schizophrenia diagnoses and both enlargement of the ventricles and over-activity of 
dopamine systems in the midbrain (the ‘dopamine hypothesis’), but questions persist. The 
control groups for these studies are sometimes inadequate, and medication and its effects 
are not always ruled out. Moreover, neither of these associations are necessary or 
sufficient for a diagnosis of schizophrenia, and neither seems to be related to it 
exclusively (Thomas, 1997). Amongst others, (Bentall, 2003) suggests that excesses of 
dopamine might simply be indicative of states of extreme arousal, whilst ventricular 
enlargement may be caused by medication. 
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Moreover, there are grounds for rejecting each of psychiatry’s core assumptions 
regarding paranoia. As with other categories of delusions, these assumptions are that the 
beliefs are false; idiosyncratic (not shared by other community members); and held with 
unwavering conviction. Beginning with falsity, psychiatry typically adopts a naively 
realist stance towards paranoia, claiming to judge the veracity of beliefs according to the 
evidence accompanying them. However, despite its realist claims, in practice diagnosis of 
delusions rarely involves empirical investigation. Instead, Maher has argued that 
assessment of the plausibility of beliefs is 'typically made by a clinician on the basis of 
"common sense," and not on the basis of a systematic evaluation of empirical data' 
(Maher, 1992 p.261), a claim backed up by evidence from observation of psychiatric 
consultations (McCabe, Heath, Burns, & Priebe, 2002). The idiosyncrasy of beliefs is 
challenged by evidence that irrational beliefs are highly prevalent in our culture – for 
example, with respect to the supernatural - and that "everyday” suspicion and mistrust are 
also more prevalent than might be expected (Social Surveys/Gallup Poll Ltd., 1995). 
Delusional beliefs too, even at levels of clinical significance, are more common amongst 
the general population than psychiatry presupposes (e.g. Poulton et al., 2000; van Os, 
Hannsen, Bijl, & Ravelli, 2000). Lastly, the notion of unwavering conviction of delusions 
is refuted by research demonstrating that conviction varies over time and across contexts 
(Garety, 1985). The dimensions which seem to differentiate between those who do not 
enter mental health services and those who do are not their beliefs per se but the levels of 
distress, conviction and preoccupation associated with them (Peters, Joseph, Day, & 
Garety, 2004). Moreover, although psychiatry typically treats the content of paranoid 
beliefs as meaningless, they often relate to purpose and meaning in a person’s life and 
can be associated with life experience (Rhodes & Jakes, 2000) or wider societal 
influences (Mirowsky & Ross, 1983). 
 
Critics of psychiatry encounter a dilemma when wishing to comment on links between 
the environment and distress, since the vast majority of relevant research depends upon 
psychiatric nosologies. Therefore, reference to these studies is not an endorsement of 
psychiatry, merely recognition that this epidemiological evidence is all that there is 
 7
Paranoia: a social account 
(Rogers & Pilgrim, 2003). With this in mind, epidemiological research clearly shows that 
paranoia is related to social and material conditions. A recent review of studies from the 
UK, USA, Canada, Australia and the Netherlands associated overall psychiatric 
morbidity with markers of inequality such as unemployment, low income and 
impoverished education (Melzer, Fryers, & Jenkins, 2004). People with a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia often have paranoid experiences, and there is a relationship between 
schizophrenia diagnoses and social inequality (Croudace, Bloom, Jones, & Harrison, 
2000; Eaton & Harrison, 2001). It is sometimes claimed that this relationship is caused by 
social selection and ‘urban drift’ i.e. people become poorer and move to deprived inner-
city areas because they get ill. This claim is contradicted by longitudinal research 
showing that people whose fathers had occupied low socio-economic status and who 
were born in a deprived area were 8.1 times more likely to attract a diagnosis  of 
schizophrenia as adults, compared to case-controls from the birth register (Harrison, 
Gunnell, Glazebrook, Page, & Kwiecinski, 2001). Independently of income inequality 
there is a relationship between minority ethnic status and schizophrenia diagnosis: black 
and Asian people in the UK, for example, are 50% more likely to be diagnosed than 
white people (King, Coker, Leavey, Hoare, & Johnson-Sabine, 1994). Genetic 
explanations for this imbalance are sometimes suggested but evidence here is both 
unconvincing (Sharpley, Hutchinson, & Murray, 2001) and rendered implausible by 
studies showing that the prevalence of schizophrenia diagnoses is higher among black 
people living in majority white areas (Boydell et al 2000). Other studies have shown that 
paranoia is associated with immigration and low socio-economic status (Kendler, 1982), 
refugee status (Westermeyer, 1989), victimisation and stressful life events (Johns et al., 
2004). There is also evidence that paranoia is associated with maleness, both in the 
general population (Johns et al., 2004) and in clinical samples, where for example 
paranoid and other core schizophrenia diagnoses are 7.5 times more likely to be applied 
to men than women (Scully et al., 2002) 
 
In contrast to psychiatry, in recent years British clinical (predominantly cognitive) 
psychologists have conducted innovative research focusing on particular kinds of 
homogeneous psychotic experience (unusual beliefs, hearing voices) rather than 
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heterogeneous diagnostic categories (e.g. schizophrenia). These researchers treat paranoia 
and its components (such as delusional beliefs, information processing biases, 
attributional styles and beliefs about self, world and other) as problems in their own right. 
Much of this work is focused specifically on delusional beliefs, and Garety & Freeman 
(2000) identify four explanatory models: delusions as explanations of unusual perceptual 
phenomena; delusions as a theory of mind deficit; delusions as a sign of problems with 
probabilistic reasoning; and delusions as a defence.  Here we will focus on the last two of 
these models, since they have provided the most sustained focus of research in recent 
years. 
 
In the model put forward by Bentall, Kinderman, & Kaney (1994), delusional beliefs 
serve a defensive function and blaming others for negative events prevents low self-
esteem thoughts from reaching consciousness. Individuals have ‘latent negative self 
representations or schemata’ – covert low self esteem – which is pushed out of awareness 
by making external, negative attributions that prevent the discrepancy between self 
presentation and self-ideals from becoming obvious. This model has since been revised to 
emphasise a cycle between attributions and self-representations, where attributions 
influence self-representations which, in turn, influence future attributions (Bentall, 
Corcoran, Howard, Blackwood, & Kinderman, 2001). In this revised model self esteem 
may be more variable, and linked to persecutory delusions in a more dynamic fashion. 
The alternative model (Freeman, Garety, Kuipers, Fowler, & Bebbington, 2002) 
developed from a concern with problems in probabilistic reasoning, and proposes that 
rather than serving a defensive function delusional beliefs directly represent the person’s 
experience, in particular their emotional state. Hence, in this model it is not necessary for 
individuals to have covert low self esteem, although they may well make external 
negative attributions in order to minimize their distress. Both models also reference other 
cognitive elements and processes, but differ with regard to the hypothesized character 
and function of delusional beliefs and their relationship with self esteem. Numerous 
published studies elaborate, test and compare aspects of these models, for example with 
regard to the role played by theory of mind deficits (Taylor & Kinderman, 2002); the 
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stability of attributional style (Bentall & Kaney, 2005); or the failure to generate more 
conventional accounts of experience (Freeman et al., 2004). 
 
Within these models and elsewhere, issues of emotion and selfhood are frequently 
discussed. Links have been made between paranoia and self-awareness: in one 
experimental study a measure of ‘public self consciousness’ correlated with scores on a 
measure of paranoia; in another, people scoring higher on a paranoia scale were more 
susceptible to the effect of an experimental manipulation using a mirror to generate an 
awareness of being watched (Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992). Trower & Chadwick (1995) 
explicitly link shame, selfhood and paranoia in their proposal that some individuals may 
experience a ‘bad me’ paranoia characterized by feelings of worthlessness and beliefs 
that they are being deservedly punished for past misdemeanours. This ‘bad me’ paranoia 
should be relatively common, although a recent study suggests that, at least in early 
psychosis, this is not the case (Fornells-Ambrojo & Garety, 2005). Studies have also 
focused on emotional perception in paranoia and its relationship to communication. One 
study of incongruent affective communication (i.e. where verbal and non-verbal 
meanings do not match) found that, compared to healthy controls, people with a 
diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia were more likely to resolve incongruity with 
reference to the verbal content of messages, whereas controls were more likely to resolve 
ambiguity with reference to the affective, non-verbal content (Davis & Stewart, 2001). 
Another study (Combs, Michael, & Penn, 2006) found a relationship between paranoia 
and emotion perception, and showed that people with clinical levels of paranoia had a 
reduced ability to recognise negative emotion. 
 
Four points can be drawn from this review of the literature. First, although the importance 
of communication is recognized, the inherently relational dimension of paranoia is 
inadequately considered. For example, Freeman et al. (2002) very briefly mention social 
isolation in relation to the development of persecutory delusions, although only in 
association with supposed individual tendencies to “be secretive or mistrustful .. or 
believe that personal matters should not be discussed with others (Freeman et al., 2002 
p.336). Similarly, they conclude a lengthy list of internal, cognitive processes that may 
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help to maintain delusions with the cursory statement that: “Finally, the person’s 
interactions with others may become disturbed. The person may act upon their delusion 
in a way that elicits hostility or isolation” (Freeman et al., 2002 p.338). In such ways, 
relational influence is both acknowledged and constrained, relegated to a subordinate 
position where causal primacy is granted to cognitive processes. Likewise, Bentall & 
Kaney (2005) discuss the attribution-self representation cycle in ways that rhetorically 
downplay relational influence, deploying a cognitive language of ‘pessimistic 
attributions’ and ‘changing beliefs about the self’ that seemingly arise and interact with 
little reference to factors external to the person. There is insufficient acknowledgement 
here that what we say about our selves and our world influences how others respond to 
us, and this in turn influences how we think and feel. Relational influences are frequently 
translated into internal, computational ones, or described with little reference to the 
material conditions and social structures by which they are mediated. More generally, 
relationality is obfuscated is through psychology’s preoccupation with the individual and 
relative neglect of the responses of others involved in interaction (Georgaca, 2004; 
Harper, 2004), a stance that ignores how people experiencing paranoia may be subject to 
reactions of others that could be viewed as conspiratorial (Lemert, 1962). 
 
Second, although emotion is obviously important in paranoia its precise contribution 
remains somewhat unclear. Freeman et al. (2002 p.335) propose that “Anxiety is.. the key 
emotion with regard to the formation of persecutory delusions”, although they 
acknowledge that other emotions (depression, anger, elation) influence delusional 
contents. Trower & Chadwick (1995) particularly emphasise the contribution of shame, 
whilst anger is also said to be especially problematic (Combs et al., 2006). Other studies 
mention feelings of threat (Taylor & Kinderman, 2002), worthlessness, disapproval, 
humiliation, entrapment (Fornells-Ambrojo & Garety, 2005) helplessness and 
powerlessness (Fornells-Ambrojo & Garety, 2005; Ross, Mirowsky, & Pribesh, 2001). 
Whilst there are clearly significant areas of overlap between the emotions posited as 
important, problems nevertheless remain. For one, some of these feelings (e.g. threat, 
disapproval, powerlessness) cannot be straightforwardly conceived of as emotions 
according to most commonly accepted definitions of that term (Griffiths, 1998); for 
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another, there is no account either of the variety of feelings related to paranoia, or of the 
ways in which they may be related. 
 
Third, the psychological literature on paranoia presents it as a largely disembodied 
condition in the sense that few links are suggested between cognitive processes and 
neural, physiological and other bodily processes. Accounts emphasise the influence and 
interaction of cognitive elements (such as attributions and self-representations), 
conceptualised as informational in character and related to each other in mechanistic 
ways. Further, whilst the role of feelings and emotions in paranoia is acknowledged, and 
indeed frequently central, their embodiment is largely disregarded. Feelings and emotions 
are enabled and constituted by neural systems spread across multiple areas including 
brainstem, amygdala, hypothalamus and limbic region (Panksepp, 1998), ventro-medial 
prefrontal cortex, insula and cingulate (Damasio, 1994), whilst some emotional states are 
associated with differential patterns of hemispheric activation (Davidson, Jackson, & 
Kalin, 2000).  However, psychology makes few attempts to associate these neural 
systems, or any other embodied aspects of emotion (increased heart rate, vascular 
constriction or dilation, pupillary changes, autonomic nervous system responses, changes 
in facial expression, posture and comportment etc.) with its cognitive accounts of 
paranoia. By contrast, although the psychiatric literature suggests some links between 
neural development and paranoia, these are relatively under developed and in any case 
predicated upon impoverished notions of social influence and problematic psychiatric 
categories. So paranoia frequently appears as thoroughly disembodied, and even where it 
is not disembodied it is nevertheless insufficiently social. 
 
Fourth, neither the psychological nor the psychiatric literature on paranoia makes 
adequate reference to material and social structural influences. Psychology simply 
subordinates these influences to cognitive processes, following the dictum that problems 
“follow from people’s perceptions and evaluations of the events in their lives rather than 
from the events themselves” (Brewin, 1988 p.5). Because its medical roots include 
epidemiology, psychiatry has been somewhat better at recognising the relationships 
between paranoia, social structures and material conditions. Simultaneously, however, 
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psychiatry is relatively handicapped in its attempts to convincingly explain these 
epidemiological associations: the heterogeneity and unreliability of psychiatric diagnosis 
problematises the identification of meaningful associations, whilst the emphasis on 
organic pathologies simply omits many of the social, relational and material factors that 
may be significant. The nature and extent of this omission is illustrated by sociological 
research demonstrating links between paranoia and such factors as low socio-economic 
status, alienated labour, exploitation, victimisation, community mistrust and widespread 
neighbourhood disorder (Mirowsky & Ross, 1983; Ross et al., 2001). So both psychiatry 
and clinical psychology, albeit in different ways, individualise paranoia. Their focus on 
cognitive processes and organic deficits mystifies material and social structural influence, 
and obscures the ways in which degrees of suspicion and mistrust, for example, may be 
functional in some environments. 
 
Consequently, clinical paranoia tends to appear as the bizarre, dysfunctional behaviour of 
deviant individuals, rather than an understandable response to particularly toxic 
combinations of material circumstances, social trajectories and life events (cf. Smail, 
1984, 1993). Below, we provide an account of paranoia that might address some of these 
issues. We begin by positing a minimal notion of embodied subjectivity constituted from 
the interpenetration of discourse, feelings and perception, within which feelings remain 
the default mode of our being. We then relate this notion of subjectivity to some of the 
relational dynamics which might be important in the ontogenesis of paranoia: in this, we 
follow the literature reviewed above and pay particular attention to feelings such as 
anxiety or fear, shame and anger. We then situate these relational dynamics within 
material environments and social structures, describing how each might amplify the 
effects of the other. 
 
Paranoia and subjectivity 
 
Our account of paranoia rests upon a minimal notion of embodied subjectivity constituted 
on the one hand from the dialectical interaction of socialized feelings and discourse, and 
on the other hand from their penetration of, and interpenetration by, external stimuli. By 
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this, we mean not just that we can comment verbally on, or feel moved by, aspects of our 
world: we also mean that the way that we feel influences the way that we experience the 
stimuli that make up our world. 
 
By discourse we mean both external, spoken formulations, and inner speech. Inner 
speech consists of truncated fragments of external, spoken speech that have been 
abbreviated and stripped of predicatives. The experience of inner speech is private and 
personal, but its origins and content are therefore social and relational, and can frequently 
be traced back to instructional episodes (Shotter, 1993a). Inner speech is called out within 
subjectivity in response to experience, and serves to monitor and guide activity by means 
of internal dialogues that mirror the conversational forms of previous social interactions 
(Vygotsky, 1962). Inner speech is important to cognition, most obviously with respect to 
the meta-cognitive monitoring and organization of activity, and can be linked to lines of 
socio-cultural development. 
 
Although in everyday life the terms are usually interchangeable, in our account feelings 
are not the same as emotions. Feelings here fall into three overlapping types: they consist 
of the somatic component of emotion, non-emotional feelings such as hunger, pain and 
sexual desire, and the subtler relational feelings of knowing that John Shotter calls 
“knowing of the third kind” (Shotter, 1993c). All three kinds of feeling are socialized: 
evidence for this comes from neuroscience (Damasio, 1994); anthropology (Shweder, 
2004); sociology and social theory (Bourdieu, 1977; Charlesworth, 1999; Elias, 1978); 
and psychology (Benson, 2001; Ginsburg & Harrington, 1996; Ratner, 2000). Because 
feelings are fundamentally non-verbal and non-representational their meaning is not 
wholly transparent, so we must frequently engage in interpretation to establish precisely 
how we feel, and why. In these interpretations, the hybrid, overlapping character of 
feelings can leads us astray: for example irritability might be a measured response to the 
unreasonable actions of others, or it might be due to low blood sugar, tiredness, or some 
mixture of these. Moreover, feelings of all kinds are continually open to social and other 
influences, and so can be vacillating, mixed or confused (Sullivan & Strongman, 2003). 
Sometimes we may fail to notice or recognise what prompted a particular feeling, and so 
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our interpretation of it may be erroneous. Further, we often have reason to disavow our 
feelings: to keep going to a job we dislike, avoid hurt to someone we care for, or protect 
ourselves against understandings too difficult or painful to contemplate. And in any case, 
much of what we feel is subtended by neural mechanisms that, whilst fundamental to 
consciousness, nevertheless operate outside of awareness (Damasio, 2003). 
 
Socialised feelings and discourse come together to co-constitute embodied subjectivity in 
the moment-by-moment flow of interaction, where both are prompted and called out by 
our material and relational position. Feelings endow our actions and talk with motives, 
valences and meanings, whilst discourse temporarily ‘fixes’ the flow of socialised 
feeling, rendering it available for representation to self and others. In subjectivity there is 
a constant iteration between socialised feelings and socially-derived inner speech, a 
dialectical relationship, a ceaseless flux of fluid movement from one to the other 
(dialectical, here, means a continual transformative movement between the two, rather 
than their turbulent dichotomous opposition). Each informs and influences the other, and 
each can come to stand for, or even become, the other because, as the term ‘dialectical’ 
suggests, the relations between feelings and discourse are fluid, mobile and 
transformative What was a largely conceptual understanding carried in discourse can, 
over time, become more feelingful: for example, a rejection of the free market economics 
of the 1980’s, which at the time was constituted of various critiques regarding it’s impact  
upon communities, industry or the public services, might now simply be experienced as 
feelings of dislike toward Margaret Thatcher. Conversely, an initial feeling of unease, 
discomfort or irritation with respect to a person or situation can subsequently be 
articulated, elaborated and eventually fixed discursively (through inner speech, 
conversation or both) such that we eventually ‘know’ and can say what is it that made us 
uncomfortable or unhappy. 
 
 So we establish the meaning of what we feel through its dialectical realization in 
language, and at the same time our speech gains force, motive and direction with respect 
to the embodied feelings that carry and inhabit it. Speech, both inner and external, is 
already feelingful, just as, by the time we can turn around and reflect upon them, feelings 
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are already shaped by the discourses we use to fix and render them available for 
inspection. Nevertheless, the dialectic between feeling and discourse is an imbalanced 
one in the sense that feelings remain the default mode of our being in the world, they 
supply the primordial stuff from which experience is socially co-constituted (Cromby, in 
press). Except when we make a deliberate effort to be otherwise, or when immediate 
situational demands require us to adopt an explicitly discursive rationality, we engage 
with our worlds in a predominantly feelingful manner. This might seem improbable to 
those readers whose academic training has rendered them professionally alexithymic, but 
evidence and arguments suggesting that feelings are the default mode of human being can 
be found in neuroscience (Damasio, 1999), anthropology (Shweder, 2004), cognitive 
psychology (Zajonc, 1980, 1984) and most schools of psychoanalysis (Mitchell & Black, 
1995). 
 
So the continual, flowing, dialectical interpenetration of feelings and inner speech is what 
most fundamentally constitutes embodied subjectivity - but this dialectic does not occur 
in a solipsistic vacuum. Modes of embodied subjectivity are themselves interpellated 
within trajectories of social participation, in a further dialectic where how we feel and 
what we say simultaneously realises, constitutes and transforms our social and relational 
position. Moreover, just as there is an interpenetrative relationship between inner speech 
and feelings, so there are similar relationships between how we feel and the world we 
occupy. As Merleau-Ponty shows, the body is not just another object in the world, it is 
the medium by which there is a world for us at all: consequently our embodied 
experience does not give us a mere version of the world - it gives us the world itself 
(Baerveldt & Voestermans, 2005). The meanings and perceptions we experience are 
intimately bound up with the bodily activities and functions that helped to produce them, 
so it follows that our world is one that is always already inhabited by embodied feelings 
that give it meaning: “The light of a candle changes its appearance for a child when, after 
a burn, it stops attracting the child’s hand and becomes quite literally repulsive. Vision is 
already inhabited by a meaning (sens) which gives it a function in the spectacle of the 
world and in our existence” (Merleau-Ponty, 2002 p.60). 
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Thus, what we see is not simply ‘out there’ in the world, since what is ‘out there’ both co-
constitutes, and is simultaneously co-constituted by, what is ‘in here’. Our perceptions 
are a matter not just of materiality and its associated sense data, but also of the feelingful, 
intentional stances with which these data are continually imbued. People in love view the 
world through rose-tinted spectacles whilst those in the throes of misery see it in shades 
of grey, but this pathetic fallacy is no mere literary device: it also indexes the ways in 
which feelingful meanings, realised through the body, continually inhabit perception. 
Feelings predispose us to perceive some things rather than others, to attend to some 
things more than others, and to interpret what we see in particular ways. Experimental 
evidence for this can be found in studies which show that bank notes look bigger to 
poorer people (Bruner & Goodman, 1947), spiders are more noticeable to those already 
frightened of them (Ohman, Flykt, & Esteves, 2001), and that our own bodies appear 
larger to those of us with eating disorders (Jansen, Smeets, Martijn, & Nederkoorn, 
2006). In the clinical realm, the perceptions and evaluations of people with a diagnosis of 
depression are typically less positive than controls and frequently characterized by a triad 
of negative views regarding self, world and future (Beck, 1967). With regard to paranoia  
(Freeman et al., 2002 p.340) make a similar point, noting that “Negative beliefs about the 
self, others and the world, which are associated with emotional distress, influence, and 
are reflected in, the contents of delusions”. In short, we don't just experience a world: we 
experience a world suffused by the materially and socially shaped anxieties, hopes, fears 
and desires that currently co-constitute our subjectivity. 
 
With regard to reasoning and decision-making, however, feelings may have a different 
kind of influence. Damasio’s (1994) ‘somatic marker’ hypothesis proposes that our 
memories include not just perceptual information about events and situations, but also the 
feelings or body-state profiles which accompanied them. On future occasions when these 
memories become relevant, the feelings that accompanied them get fleetingly re-
constituted in feedback loops between brain and body. These ‘somatic markers’ feed 
forward into decision-making by supplying valences which mark options as more or less 
positive or negative, according to previous experience. Unpleasant or negative feelings 
have the effect of both directing attention away from objects, events and situations with 
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which they are associated and making them appear undesirable; positive feelings do the 
opposite, encouraging both lengthier engagement and a more favourable assessment. 
Although many areas of the brain might assist in the generation of somatic markers, the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex and areas of the insula, cingulate and sensori-motor 
cortexes are frequently involved (Damasio, 1994). 
 
Two aspects of this hypothesis must be emphasized. First, that these brain circuits are not 
‘the brain’s decision-making system’, since decision making is not only spread across the 
entire brain, but is a quality of persons, not brains (Bennett & Hacker, 2003): it arises in 
the transactions between persons and their situations, not simply within their brains. So 
somatic markers can simplify and accelerate decision making, but cannot themselves 
decide anything. Second somatic markers are socially, relationally acquired in the course 
of experience: although their neural basis is in the machinery that enables 
homeodynamics, their particular character reflects both the specifics of individual 
experience and the (sub)cultural norms within which that experience occurred. As Damasio 
puts it: "Somatic markers are thus acquired by experience, under the control of an internal 
preference system and under the influence of an external set of circumstances which 
include not only entities and events with which the organism must interact, but also social 
conventions and ethical rules" (Damasio, 1994 p.179).  With regard to paranoia, such 
experiences might include poor attachment with caregivers, bullying and other forms of 
victimisation, whilst relevant social conventions might include normative assumptions of 
prejudice, difference and inequality. 
 
The literature suggests that fear and anxiety figure prominently in paranoia although the 
somatic marker system by itself seems unlikely to enable these feelings, for which lateral 
and central nuclei of the amygdala, the ventral-anterior and medial hypothalamus and 
parts of the peri-aqueductal gray appear particularly important (Le Doux, 2000; 
Panksepp, 1998). Nevertheless, through its connections with these brain regions the 
somatic marker system might serve to call out feelings of fear and anxiety, and may also 
evoke neural images of them through the operation of what (Damasio, 1994) calls the ‘as-
if body’ loop. Accordingly, it might be involved both in propitiating experiences of fear 
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and anxiety, and in the creation of habits that structure activity in anticipatory avoidance 
of them. Simultaneously, the hypothesis implies that efforts to recognize the origins of 
these feelings will tend to be somewhat comprised, because they will act as negative 
somatic markers for the habits, events, people and situations with which they are 
associated. Consequently, people may tend to orient away from them, to prefer not to talk 
or think about them: making it likely that they will produce discursive accounts that 
disavow their anxiety, or attribute it to other causes or objects. 
 
This neural bias may be further accentuated for many individuals by feelings of shame. 
Shame is a complex emotion tied to the specifics of social relations, serving to signal that 
something is in need of repair in our standing with others. Its particular complexity arises 
in part from the fact that, unlike most other emotions, its object is the self in relation to 
others. Consequently, we understand our own shame to the limited extent that we 
understand ourselves and our relationships. There is frequently a reflexive dimension to 
feelings of shame, since shame itself may be both shaming and shameful – especially for 
men in our culture, for whom subcultural norms prohibit the expression of shame and 
favour proud, self-aggrandising modes of presentation. Shame may be a prominent 
component of many states of distress (Kaufman, 1991), and its specific relevance to some 
forms of paranoia has been emphasized by Trower & Chadwick (1995). In a detailed 
study of a corpus of transcripts of shame and anger episodes in autobiographical 
accounts, Lewis (1971) found that descriptions of anger were invariably preceded by 
description of events where shame might reasonably be assumed to be present, but was 
neither acknowledged nor discussed. She also found that when shame is disavowed or 
'bypassed' in this way, speech becomes more rapid and its content frequently becomes 
repetitive or obsessive. The narratives of people who experience paranoia may show 
evidence of both rapid speech and obsessive themes – for example concerning the 
machinations of government, the arcane powers of technology, and conspiracies of racist 
organisations or security forces, religious groups or aliens. The prevalence of these 
features in paranoia narratives suggests that disavowed shameful feelings may frequently 
play a significant role in the ontogenesis of paranoia, despite apparent evidence to the 
contrary (Fornells-Ambrojo & Garety, 2005). 
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So feelings act to imbue perception with meanings consonant with their character; 
simultaneously, they also act to bias and guide our discursive constructions in ways that 
avoid or circumvent negatives and orient preferentially toward positives. There is a 
neural dynamic between feelings, perception and discourse that on the one hand may 
make perception a matter of anxiety, but on the other predispose discursive constructions 
to orient away from authentic accounts of the causes of that anxiety. Consequently, 
individuals might perceive their world as a fearful and hostile place, but simultaneously 
be relatively handicapped in their attempts to account for their fears in terms of their own 
life experiences. When anxiety is also combined with shame it is likely to provide further, 
strong disincentives to authenticity, compounding and accentuating this neural dynamic 
by enmeshing it within a social and relational one by which it may be amplified, 
reinforced and – as will become clear – further transformed. 
 
Gazzaniga (2000) proposes that humans have left-brain systems that spontaneously 
generate discursive commentaries upon our own and others’ activity: although he does 
not link his work to Vygotsky’s, his claim nevertheless seems to be that this is the neural 
basis of inner speech. His experimental work with split-brain patients (e.g. Gazzaniga et 
al., 1996) has demonstrated that discursive constructions generated by this left-
hemisphere system are sometimes confabulations: demonstrably erroneous, but 
(consistent with a default role for feelings and a strong role for social influence) shaped 
by affective influences, and oriented towards situated interactional demands. Some of 
Gazzaniga’s studies suggest that the tendency to confabulate is also present in everyday 
life, a conclusion also implied by empirical work in discursive psychology (e.g. Edwards 
& Potter, 1992) which amply demonstrates that, whilst our discursive constructions may 
more-or-less loosely correspond to the ‘truth’, they are typically rhetorically organised, 
oriented towards the interactional demands of their current situation, and functional in the 
sense that they endow the speaker with legitimacy, or manage dilemmas of stake and 
accountability. 
 
Whilst paranoid discursive constructions may also, in a sense, be confabulations, they 
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frequently position the speaker as relatively important or powerful, or in possession of 
arcane or specialist knowledge which – if true - would raise their social status. In this 
sense they too may be oriented towards the situated demands of social interaction, 
representing attempts at the relational management of feelings of anxiety and shame: 
consequently, narratives that are imbued with some degree of self-aggrandisement, and 
would have the interactional consequence (if believed) of raising their author’s apparent 
status, are likely to be prevalent. Status-related concerns are likely to be enhanced and 
magnified for most who enter the realm of treatment and diagnosis, because the 
stigmatising associations of 'mental illness', and associated discriminatory social practices 
(e.g. exclusion from employment), are widely recognised (Hayward & Bright, 1997). 
This may be especially so for interactions with professionals, where self-presentations are 
not only interactionally relevant but might have additional significance because of their 
possible influence upon treatment or related decisions. 
 
Whilst the specific feelings that constitute paranoia, for any given individual, will vary as 
a function of their particular life history and its specific trajectories of social 
participation, it is nevertheless possible to identify some feelings which are likely to be 
more prevalent than others. In accord with the literature we have argued that feelings of 
shame and fear or anxiety are likely to be especially prevalent; in addition, and even 
though it only figures occasionally (Combs et al., 2006) there is reason to suppose that 
feelings of anger are often significant. First, this is suggested by narrative accounts that 
presume the hostility of others and which, by relational reciprocity, suggest at least the 
possibility of hostility or anger on the part of the person generating them. Second, Lewis 
(1971) found that bypassed shame was frequently followed by feelings of anger, and 
paranoid discursive constructions display evidence of bypassed shame (rapid speech and 
obsessive preoccupation). Third, a small minority of people who experience paranoia do 
become angry and violent – most commonly toward people that they know, but 
sometimes towards strangers. 
 
Feeling Traps 
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So paranoia is constituted by socialized feelings, which on the one hand imbue 
perceptions with hostility and anxiety, and on the other predispose individuals to generate 
discursive constructions structured by mixtures of fear, shame, anger or similar feelings. 
The understanding that mixtures of feeling are relevant is of particular significance, since 
it helps explain why some people persistently generate paranoid discursive constructions, 
even though their effects are stigmatizing, hinder access to employment, impair 
relationships, and increase social isolation. Scheff (2003) discusses the significance of 
mixtures of feeling, describing them as ‘feeling traps’ to refer to the ways in which 
feelings interact with each other. 
 
When they co-occur, feelings can form self-perpetuating loops which cause them to be 
intensified, extended across time and generalized across social situations. For example, 
people who tend to blush with embarrassment may become acutely, reflexively aware 
that they do so. Consequently, they may become both anxious that they will blush and 
ashamed that they might do so: but these feelings of anxiety and shame perpetuate and 
intensify their feelings of embarrassment, and so make further blushing more likely. 
Similarly, Scheff (2003) uses biographies of Adolf Hitler to suggest that his early 
childhood was characterized by an ongoing feeling trap, where anger, humiliation and 
abuse directed at him by his father was accompanied by adoration and love from his 
mother. Despite continually telling the young Adolf that she loved him, his mother failed 
to protect him from his father. Hitler grew up within an affective dynamic which 
predisposed him to feel rage and shame at the treatment meted out to him by his father, 
yet simultaneously to deny or ignore these feelings because they were not validated, 
either by his mother or by anyone else. Scheff proposes that many elements of Hitler's 
later comportment and behaviour (his piercing stare, obsessive character, temper 
tantrums, anger and continual preoccupation with pride) derive from this early 
socialization, which endowed him with strong propensities toward shame and anger 
whilst simultaneously training him to disavow those feelings. Consequently, Hitler 
veered between two different but equally shame-oriented ways of being in the world. At 
one extreme he managed a complete and thorough disavowal of his shame, evidenced by 
a mode of comportment consisting of rapid, high pressure speech, an aggressive 
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domineering manner, a piercing stare and an obsessive narrative style. Alternatively, 
however, his demeanour was sometimes characterised by obsequiousness, excessive 
humility and discursive constructions of his own lowly status and lack of worth - even 
after he had become Chancellor. 
 
Feeling traps, then, serve to intensify the feelings which constitute them, and to extend 
and generalise them beyond the relational or situational dynamics that initially produced 
them. In this way, they can inculcate habits of feeling, relationally acquired tendencies to 
feel a particular way in response to a given kind of situation or event. Their affective 
dynamics are acquired in a Vygotskian fashion: just as inner speech has its origins in 
actual conversations between people, so too the mixtures of feelings within subjectivity 
are relationally constituted. To the extent that we have a propensity to feel a predictable 
way in a given situation, this is because we have acquired this propensity on the basis of 
relational dynamics to which we have previously been exposed. For example, Kaffman 
(1981, 1983) has argued that family transactional patterns may play a critical role in the 
development of paranoid delusions, in particular where there is a philosophy of life 
characterised by inflexible rules, irrational beliefs, distrust, apprehensiveness and hate 
and where family members intrude on each others’ actions and feelings with mutual 
reinforcement of paranoid ideas. Such relational dynamics may also inform 
developmental trajectories in teenage years, combining with pressures induced by 
increased consciousness of the gaze of others and feelings of trepidation associated with 
the expectation of becoming an autonomous agent, to contribute to the rise in diagnoses 
of psychosis at this age (Harrop & Trower, 2003). 
 
Moreover, because social relations are patterned according to distinctions such as gender 
and ethnicity, we should expect the structuring of subjectivity to at least partially reflect 
these patterns. One problem of much research into paranoia is its focus on abstract, de-
contextualised notions of paranoia, rather than the paranoia that might be experienced by 
a person of a certain gender, age, class, ethnicity and so on.  When forms of difference 
are investigated, such research typically seeks gross differences between groups, rather 
than exploring subtle, nuanced variation in the meaning and signification of actual 
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concrete experiences. It is nevertheless possible that the empirical associations between 
maleness and paranoia might in part be due to patterns of male socialization and their 
associated relational expectations of strength and the ability to protect, provide, care for 
and watch over others. Similarly racism, in the gross form of physical assaults, verbal 
abuse, prejudice and discrimination, as well as more subtle, continuous everyday minor 
omissions and slights, might partially account for the relationship between minority 
ethnic status and paranoia (Chakraborty & McKenzie, 2002). In a gendered, racially-
discriminatory society, being both male and non-white is likely to be associated with 
relational dynamics characterized on the one hand by suspicion, mistrust, vigilance, 
apprehension, and anxiety, and on the other by strong imperatives to deny and disavow 
these feelings in order to appear proud, competent, confident and strong. Moreover 
normative expectations around gender roles, racial prejudice and discrimination may 
mean that similar feelings, including those associated with paranoia, signify differently. 
For example, feelings of fear and anxiety associated with threatening city-centre 
environments can get configured as either ‘streetwise’ or ‘silly’ depending on gender 
(Edley & Wetherell, 1995). 
 
Even though affective propensities may be acquired in this Vygotskian fashion, they are 
always in a continual, relational exchange with ongoing social interaction. One 
consequence of this is that paranoia will ebb and flow, according to changing relational 
and material circumstances (Garety, 1985). Another is that the mixtures of (for example) 
fear, shame and anger that constitute paranoia can propitiate trajectories of social 
participation which tend to increase social isolation, marginalisation and stigmatization. 
Individuals who persistently deploy paranoid discursive constructions are likely to 
encounter disbelief, rejection and mistrust from others, relational responses which may 
generate yet more feelings of fear, shame and anger – feelings which, in turn, may 
predispose them to produce additional paranoid accounts. In this way individuals may 
acquire habits of feeling that then operate pre-reflectively, structuring perceptions and 
activity in ways that seem simply given. Simulataneously, the responses of other may 
also assume habitual characteristics, perhaps of being wary about the person or vigilant 
about one’s social contact with them. Unhelpful trajectories of social participation may 
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ensue: feelingful modes of subjectivity characterised by mixtures of fear, shame and 
anger can propitiate relational choices and discursive constructions that generate yet more 
of these same feelings. The interpenetration, flow and exchange of relational dynamics 
and subjectivity can mean that perceptions repeatedly get structured by low-level 
mixtures of anger, shame and fear; their interpenetration can reach such a pitch that 
reality momentarily becomes wholly terrifying, hostile or shaming; and both of these 
things can happen, either alternately or in conjunction with each other. 
 
In these ways, individuals can come to be effectively locked into socialized mixtures of 
intensely distressing feelings. If the relational, social and material circumstances that 
sustain them are prolonged, these mixtures of overt and bypassed feelings may eventually 
induce such a highly aroused state that anger, fear and shame come to dominate both 
perceptions and discourse. In this way, we suggest, intense, overwhelming or ‘florid’ 
states are produced - but, rather than being the outcome of faulty brains, these states are 
relationally generated within the embodied dialectical interchanges between perception, 
discourse, feeling and social relations. Moreover, once they have occurred, such states 
bear their own significant social and embodied meanings. Bodily, florid states may act as 
tipping points, momentous occasions when the apparent security and solidity of the 
world, usually given to us effortlessly by our embodied engagements within it, is 
suddenly, shockingly, revealed as a somewhat fragile achievement. In this way, what 
Laing (1960) called ‘ontological insecurity’ might be just as much an effect as a cause of 
distress, its experience serving to endow moments of floridity with greatly increased 
salience. Socially, they may be stigmatizing, devaluing and frightening because of their 
widely-recognised associations with pathology, illness and deviance, associations 
frequently emphasised by the trauma of hospitalisation and (sometimes forcible) 
treatment, experiences likely to themselves engender feelings of panic and loss of control 
(Morrison, Frame, & Larkin, 2003).  
 
Thus, there are reciprocal, responsive relationships between embodied subjectivity and 
social relations, a mutually constitutive flow and interchange. Florid paranoia, as a mode 
of embodied subjectivity, is the emergent outcome of particular configurations of 
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socialized feelings which mould perception, propitiate discourse and influence 
relationships. Like all modes of subjectivity florid paranoia is enabled by neural 
processes, but those processes need not themselves be pathological. The production of 
feelings, their organization and influence over activity and decision making through the 
operation of somatic markers, the interactions between those feelings and the inner 
speech of the ‘interpreter’: all of these processes occur in everyday life as well as in florid 
paranoia, but in florid paranoia their content and their temporary patterns of relative 
dominance may differ. This is not to say that the brain states of people experiencing 
florid paranoia are identical to those of other people: they are not, since their experiences 
are dissimilar. But this emphasis on process might account for some of the pattern of 
inconsistent associations between brain structures and functions and the various 
diagnostic categories across which paranoia is distributed. For example, dopamine is 
continually available in the brain, but for highly aroused individuals it might be present at 
increased levels that enhance the significance of perceptions and magnify the structuring 
impact of mixtures of feelings. This may be why the various compounds that (amongst 
other effects) reduce the availability of dopamine can sometimes ameliorate florid 
paranoia – but may also be why their effects are neither immediate, nor universally 
beneficial. The ‘dopamine hypothesis’ of schizophrenia is wrong: not just because 
schizophrenia is an incoherent concept (Boyle, 2002) but because, like other neural 
processes, levels of dopamine are open to material, social and relational influences. In 
short, even though florid paranoia is both experienced individually and enabled neurally, 
its origins and maintenance are profoundly and intimately social, and to the extent that it 
appears as an enduring propensity or feature of an individual this is because repetition 
and salience have combined to render it a habitual reaction. 
 
Paranoia, Social Structures and Material Influences 
 
So far, this account has emphasized the relational processes by which paranoia might be 
produced, but all social relations are played out in material settings that, in turn, are both 
productive of, and produced by, societal relations of power. Consequently, by examining 
relational dynamics, social structures and material factors, we might begin to construct an 
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explanation for the empirical association between paranoia and social inequality. 
However, in doing so we must emphasize that social inequality is not uniform, does not 
impact upon people uniformly, and is nott responded to or dealt with uniformly. The 
social realm and our relations within it are complex, variegated, dynamic and mobile, so 
simple Humean models of causality are inadequate to its ontological complexity. For one, 
the great variety of shifting, dynamically interacting cultural forms, relational practices, 
lines of power, spatial and material organizations and temporal shifts that constitute 
social reality mean that there are always degrees of contingency, chance and chaos and 
unexpected outcomes can always emerge: social influence is necessarily probabilistic, 
not deterministic (Archer, 1995). For another, our being and becoming are always subject 
to the kind of radical relational uncertainty that Shotter (1993b) characterizes as “joint 
action”, within which the outcomes of interactions are sensitively dependent upon the 
dialogically-shaped co-responses of participants. Just as not all experiences of male 
socialization or racist social relations produce paranoia, so paranoia is neither confined to 
disadvantaged groups, nor ubiquitous amongst them: but we can nevertheless identify 
three sets of reasons why it will be more prevalent in conditions of social inequality. 
 
A first set of reasons flows from the likelihood that the kinds of relational dynamics we 
have described might be more prevalent, or gain more relevance, in conditions of 
persistent social inequality. As Charlesworth’s (1999) sensitive ethnographic study 
documents, the exigencies of dealing with low status, low pay, long hours, job insecurity 
or unemployment produce feelings such as anxiety, misery, despair, anger and shame. 
Simultaneously, the material need to persist in coping with both these feelings and the 
circumstances that created them may encourage tendencies to disavowal or bypassing. 
These feelings and their consequences may impact negatively upon family life and 
relationships, imbuing them with a toxic character derived from the wider social realm. 
Consequently, it is understandable that some people may come to favour interactional 
styles that are relatively hostile, distant, controlling and emotionally guarded, ways of 
relating with negative consequences – especially, perhaps, when they inhabit modes of 
parenting. Moreover, and relatedly, people may have less time and ability to bestow upon 
those around them the compensatory affection, love and reassurance that might counter-
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act and insulate against the negative feelings their social world inculcates. Additionally, 
there are reasons to believe that shaming and hostile discourses, and associated, devalued 
subject positions, can gain greater legitimacy and purchase in conditions of persistent 
social inequality. Angry or hostile discourses can boost status, ward off threats, and 
construct tough personae that make attacks and exploitation less likely. Similarly, 
shaming or denigratory discourses and low-status subject positions might be legitimated 
and reinforced by their associations with and prevalence within the processes of claiming 
social security benefits, working in devalued occupations, or in social relations generally 
where lower status is frequently presumed by others on the basis of accent, clothing, or 
appearance. 
 
Second, the social and material circumstances of social inequality might themselves 
induce paranoia, over and above their impact upon relationships. Ross et al. (2001) argue 
that disadvantaged areas are typically characterized by degrees of disorder, and occupied 
by relatively powerless communities with low levels of overt mutual trust. People living 
in such areas face an increased risk of assault, theft and burglary, their material 
environments contain relatively high levels of graffiti, vandalism, and derelict buildings, 
and street drinking, drug use and visible gangs are all more common. People may respond 
with modes of comportment that decry vulnerability, shame and anxiety and present an 
appropriately 'hard' exterior (‘you have to laugh, or else you’d cry’). People living in 
disadvantaged areas are also typically subject to greater threat and insecurity because 
they are more likely to lose their jobs or become homeless, social isolation is often 
greater, and people have both fewer opportunities and more restricted choices than those 
who are wealthier - problems which are both exacerbated by, and causal of, higher levels 
of ill health. 
 
Third, relational dynamics, social and material circumstances will interact, such that each 
may serve to amplify the toxic effects of the other. Increased population density, smaller 
dwellings, greater degrees of social and financial interdependency, and limited resources 
and opportunities may mean that the toxic effects of some relational dynamics are felt 
more keenly. For example, there is evidence that sexual and physical abuse may be causal 
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in psychosis, a condition that frequently includes paranoia: Reed, van Os, Morrison, & 
Ross (2005) showed that on average 69% of women and 59% of men with psychosis 
disclose such experiences. There is research relating male unemployment to physical 
abuse (Gillham et al., 1998), and showing that the incidence of physical abuse is 
patterned according to socioeconomic and demographic variables (Jack, 2004). Whilst 
there is no corresponding evidence for sexual abuse, the toxic consequences of both kinds 
of abuse may be magnified by social inequality, since closer proximity, more shared 
living space and fewer opportunities for respite or escape mean that contact with the 
abuser is likely to be more sustained, frequent, prolonged or intense. This does not mean 
that only or all those subject to inequality experience paranoia, but illustrates how the 
contingent associations between social and material conditions and relational dynamics 
are synergistic, not additive (Nightingale & Cromby, 2002). Consequently, modes of 
florid paranoia shaped by logics that diverge far from the norm can emerge from 
environments and relations which appear, to outside observers, much the same as any 
other. But even when paranoia takes such superficially bizarre forms, this analysis 
suggests that it can usually be systematically related to life events, relational dynamics, 
and material and social conditions. 
 
Implications 
 
Any exposition of this kind carries the danger of reifying its subject, so we should remind 
ourselves again that paranoia is not a thing but the name we give to a mode or tendency 
within subjectivity. Moreover, despite the commonalities we have identified this 
tendency or mode is not homogenous: its interdependency with social structures, material 
environments and relational dynamics, themselves constantly in flux, means that its 
properties (narrative content, affective texture, levels of distress and preoccupation etc.) 
are necessarily variable. What we call paranoia will have differential qualities, both 
between and within individuals, according to life trajectories and the specifics of actual 
relationships and environments. Sometimes, as Bentall et al. (2001) propose, it might 
serve a predominantly defensive function, warding off threats to self-esteem by bolstering 
and aggrandizing the self; at other times it might be predominantly threat-laden, the direct 
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effect of anxious, fear-laden perceptions as they feed into and are shaped by social 
relations (Freeman et al., 2002). In both cases it will further vary according to the relative 
prominence of each of the feelings (fear, anger, shame, etc.) from which it is constituted, 
and vary yet more according to the extent to which it is constituted from lived feelings 
called out in that very moment, versus the extent to which it is currently constituted from 
acquired habits of feeling that have become so thoroughly routine that their shadows 
inhabit and inflect activity and perception, even when actual, momentary feelings are not 
present. 
 
This has implications for both research and intervention. With respect to research, further 
empirical investigation of both the relational dynamics of paranoia and their interaction 
with material factors and social structures is necessary. Cognitively-oriented research into 
paranoia might usefully incorporate analyses of social and relational factors, in so doing 
resolving more variance and, perhaps, refining and developing its own models. Similarly, 
biomedical and neuroscientific research might draw upon this notion of paranoia as a 
social product in order to guide investigations, choose methods, and so contribute to a 
meaningful social neuroscience (Cromby, 2006). 
 
With regard to intervention, the emphasis here on feelings suggests that many of the 
recommendations made by (Freeman et al., 2002) may be relevant: greater attention to 
the establishment of rapport, more attention to possible experiences of discrimination, 
and the provision of coping strategies early in therapy in order to build trust and 
minimize distress. Previously, much therapeutic work has focused, both implicitly and 
explicitly, on the veracity of beliefs, but recently an alternative focus on the ‘fit’ between 
people’s beliefs and the lives they wish to lead has been suggested (Knight, 2005). 
Harper (2004), for example, draws on the work of the Hearing Voices movement and of 
Romme & Escher (1993, 2000) to argue that it is important to explore the meaning of 
unusual beliefs (i.e. their context and relationship to the person’s biography). He suggests 
that therapists help the person develop an explanation for their experiences which makes 
sense to them; does not unduly distress them; puts them in contact with a community 
which shares these meanings; and allows them to lead the lives they wish to. Cromby & 
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Harper (2005) similarly advocate both a greater focus on relationships and the goal of 
helping clients to achieve an acceptable re-narration of their experiences, but also 
recommend a more implicit orientation towards paranoia’s social and material 
dimensions. Indeed, since a frequent effect of paranoia is to increase people’s isolation 
from others, interventions that address this may be beneficial. The development of 
support groups like the Paranoia Network (James, 2003) is helpful in this regard, as is 
help to get involved with community activities, self-help and support groups, and 
involvement in campaigning and other activities that engender solidarity, security and 
belonging. And finally, at the level of social and economic policy, it should be clear from 
the arguments presented in this paper that moves to ameliorate social inequality and 
redress its toxic effects are of enduring and fundamental significance. 
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